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Abstract
SET is a secure credit card payment protocol that provides a robust security 
model based on data integrity, data confidentiality and mutual authen-
tication to deliver personal and financial information through Internet. 
However, the parties involved in the transaction must carry out a lot of 
cryptographic operations which can be a problem when these parties use 
mobile devices with low processing and storage capacities. This paper 
shows how the computational cost of the SET protocol can be reduced 
when another protocol called TRUTHC is used in conjunction with the 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Results show that the total execution 
time can be reduced about 3% using TRUTHC from the customer point of 
view. This reduction is still the same in spite of the increase of path length.
Keywords: Bluetooth technology, certification path validation, com-
putational cost, mobile payment, SET protocol, TRUTHC.
Resumen
SET es un protocolo seguro de pago, con tarjeta de crédito, que proporciona 
un modelo robusto de seguridad para entregar información personal y 
financiera a través de Internet, basado en la integridad de los datos, su 
confidencialidad y la autenticación mutua. Sin embargo, las partes in-
volucradas en una transacción deben llevar a cabo diversas operaciones 
criptográficas, lo que puede ser un problema cuando se usan dispositivos 
móviles con baja capacidad de almacenamiento y procesamiento. Este 
artículo muestra como se puede reducir el coste computacional de SET, 
mediante el uso de otro protocolo llamado TRUTHC en conjunto con una 
Infraestructura de Clave Pública (PKI). Los resultados muestran que, 
usando TRUTHC, el tiempo total de ejecución puede ser reducido un 3% 
desde el punto de vista del cliente. Esta reducción se mantiene aunque 
aumente la longitud del camino de certificación.
Palabras clave: Coste computacional, pago móvil, protocolo SET, 
tecnología bluetooth, TRUTHC, validación de caminos de certificación.
1. INTRODUCTION
In mobile payment systems, customers can pay for products and services 
anywhere and anytime with the comfort offered by their mobile devices. 
In this scenario, security is important because transactions are achieved 
without any physical contact between the customer and merchant. Also, 
payment information is sent through an open environment, and somebody 
in the coverage area, with the appropriate equipment, can hear the com-
munication and modify information. Thus, participants can be victims 
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of fraud. The use of certificates avoids the repudiation of a transaction, 
guarantees the integrity and origin of data through digital signatures, and 
allows establishing a secure channel for payments.
SET is a secure credit card payment protocol that involves the use of certifi-
cates and cryptographic operations to protect the information exchanged 
among the participants in the payment transaction. However, these cryp-
tographic operations demand mobile devices with high processing and 
storage capacities in order to carry out the whole protocol.
Certification path validation increases complexity of SET protocol. Satizábal 
et al. [1] proposed TRUTHC (Trust Relationship Using Two Hash Chains) 
to improve the efficiency of certification path validation process, since this 
mechanism establishes an alternative trust relationship among different 
entities of a hierarchical PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) using hash chains 
instead of signature verification operations. In a previous work, it was 
evaluated the performance of TRUTHC in WTLS protocol using a general 
mobile payment scenario and compared it with a typical PKI [2].
In this paper, the computational cost of the customer and merchant in SET 
protocol is reduced using TRUTHC. In addition, the transmission time and 
the whole execution time of the protocol are calculated. Section 2 describes 
mobile payment security. Section 3 shows the characteristics of Bluetooth. 
Section 4 explains the operation of SET protocol. Section 5 defines WPKI, 
certification path validation and hierarchical architectures. Section 6 de-
scribes the operation of TRUTHC. Section 7 presents the calculation of the 
computational cost, the transmission time and the whole execution time 
of SET protocol. In addition, the whole execution time of a typical PKI is 
compared with the time of a PKI with TRUTHC. Finally, section 8 presents 
the conclusion.
2. MOBILE PAYMENT SECURITY
Mobile payment is defined as the process of exchanging financial values 
between two parties (customer and merchant) using a mobile device to pay 
for products or services [3], [4].
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Mobile payment protocols must offer robust security because the financial 
data are sent over wireless networks. In this sense, customers and merchants 
require mutual authentication, payment authorization, confidentiality, 
integrity and non-repudiation [5], as follows:
• Authentication: mobile payment systems must offer the option to 
authenticate each entity (mutual authentication).
• Authorization: mobile payment systems should request confirma-
tion of the payment.
• Integrity: mobile payment systems must guarantee that the messages 
have not been modified.
• Non-repudiation: mobile payment systems should avoid refuting 
payments.
• Privacy: mobile payment systems must avoid eavesdroppers to have 
access to the messages.
3. BLUETOOTH TECHNOLOGY
Bluetooth is a wireless technology to interconnect mobile devices to each 
other, or with other devices via point-to-many or point-to-point commu-
nications. This technology transfers voice, data, and video in real time. 
The transmission area is omnidirectional and its transfer rate is 1Mbps. 
The maximum distance between the data origin (source) and the receiver 
is around 10m. Bluetooth technology is a key issue in mobile commerce 
because it enables mobile devices to pay for goods or services [6], [7].
Baseband layer
Bluetooth technology uses two types of links to establish a connection 
among devices: Synchronous Connection Oriented (SCO) and Asynchro-
nous Connectionless Link (ACL). SCO link establishes a point-to-point 
connection and it is a symmetric dedicated link between two devices. On 
the other hand, ACL link establishes a point-to-multipoint connection and 
it is an asynchronous link among all the devices. The first type of link is a 
circuit switched connection between the master and slave, while ACL link 
is a packet switched connection among the master and all the slaves. 
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SCO link guarantees the delay and bandwidth to transmit an average qual-
ity of voice and music by the use of the Link Management Protocol (LMP). 
LMP performs the link configuration such as quality of service (QoS) [7].
On the other hand, there are two different ACL link packets (frames): 1) 
DMX, where the payload is encoded and 2) DHX, where the payload is 
unprotected. The value of ´X´ stands for the number of slots required to 
transmit the frame. DMX types are DM1, DM3 and DM5, which includes 
Forward Error Correction (FEC), Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) code and 
Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ). Table 1 summarizes the DMX and DHX 
link packet types’ characteristics [6].
Table 1. Characteristics of ACL link packets
Asymmetric max rate
(Kbps)
Type User Payload(bytes) FEC CRC
Symmetric max rate
(Kbps) Forward Reverse
DM1 0-17 2/3 YES 108.8 108.8 108.8
DM3 0-121 2/3 Yes 258.1 387.2 54.4
DM5 0-224 2/3 Yes 286.7 477.8 36.3
DH1 0-27 no Yes 172.8 172.8 172.8
DH3 0-183 no Yes 390.4 585.6 86.4
DH5 0-339 no Yes 433.9 723.2 185.6
Physical layer
Bluetooth technology transmits and receives on the frequency band of 2.4 
GHz. The band is divided into 79 MHz wide channels that are spaced 1 
MHz. This layer utilizes Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) as 
technique of transmission. FHSS can reduce the impact of jamming and 
interference caused by other systems. The transmission channel changes 
1600 times per second. Bluetooth technology uses a slotted Time Division 
Duplex (TDD) scheme for duplex transmission, where each time slot is 
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625µs. Each slot corresponds to a different transmission (Figure 1). The 
master uses the even numbered time slots to transmit, while the slaves use 
the odd numbered time slots [6].
Figure 1. Transmissions of single-slot and multi-slot link packets
4. SECURE ELECTRONIC TRANSACTION (SET)
Financial institutions developed a secure credit card payment protocol over 
open networks, called SET [8]. This protocol provides a robust security model 
based on data integrity, data confidentiality and mutual authentication to 
deliver personal and financial information through Internet. For that reason, 
customer C and merchant M carry out several cryptographic operations that 
require CPU execution time and power consumption. Moreover, the trans-
mission of the information increases the time of the payment transaction.
The number of cryptographic operations carried out by each entity during 
the transactions of SET protocol are summarized in Table 2. The process 
is as follows:
1. M discovers and associates the customer’s device.
2. C initializes the protocol sending an Initial Request message to the 
merchant.
3. M sends to C his/her certificate (CERTM), payment gateway’s cer-
tificate (CERTPG), and the TID (unique identifier of the transaction) 
signed with his/her private key ({TID}KM-1).
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4. C verifies the certification path of M and the Payment Gateway (PG). 
5. C sends to M the OI (Order Information); the PI (Payment Informa-
tion); the hash value of the order information (H(OI)) and the hash 
of the payment information (H(PI)) encrypted with the symmetric 
key k1; k1 signed with his/her private key ({k1}KC-1); the hash of 
OI and PI encrypted with the symmetric key k2; k2 encrypted with 
the payment gateway’s public key ({k2}KPG); and his/her digital 
certificate (CERTC). To obtain TID, C must carry out a verification 
operation with the public key of M (KM).
6. M verifies the certification path of C.
7. M verifies the integrity of the OI and PI. For that reason, M must 
carry out a verification operation with the public key of C (KC) to 
obtain k1. Then, M uses k1 to decrypt (H(OI),H(PI)), makes a hash 
over OI and another hash over PI, and compares them with the 
decrypted values. In addition, M adds TID, Price and Date to the 
message, and signs the message with his/her private key (KM-1). 
Then, M encrypts the message with the PG public key (KPG) and 
forwards it to PG.
8. PG decrypts the message using his/her private key (KPG-1) and veri-
fies the integrity of OI and PI. To do this process, PG must carry out 
a verification operation with the public key of M (KM). Then, PG 
must use its private key (KPG-1) to decrypt k2 and the public key of 
C (KC) to verify the signature over k1. With these symmetric keys, 
PG decrypts (H(OI), PI) and (H(OI), H(PI)). Later, PG calculates a 
hash over OI and another over PI, and compares the results with 
the received values. Later, PG approves or rejects the transaction 
and sends the response message to M signed with its private key 
(KPG-1) and encrypted with the public key of M (KM).
9. M decrypts the message and verifies the signature. M forwards 
the response signed with his/her private key (KM-1) to C. Finally, 
C verifies the signature and knows the status of the transaction.
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Table 2. Cryptographic operations without authentication in SET protocol
Cryptographic operation Customer Merchant PG
Encryption 1 1 1
Decryption 0 1 2
Signature creation 1 3 1
Signature verification 2 2 2
Symmetric encryption 2 0 0
Symmetric decryption 0 1 2
Hash function 2 2 2
5. WAP PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (WPKI)
WPKI [9] is an optimised extension of the typical PKI (Public Key Infrastruc-
ture) [10] for the wireless environment.
WPKI requires the same components used in a typical PKI: Certification 
Authorities (CAs), Registration Authorities (RAs), End Entities (EEs), PKI 
Directories (DIRs); and adds a new component, called PKI Portal. The PKI 
Portal is responsible for translating requests made by the WAP client to the 
RA and CA in the PKI. The PKI Portal will typically embed the RA functions 
and interoperate with the WAP devices on the wireless network and the 
CAs on the wired network (Figure 2).
The general model adopted in the current version of WPKI is, according to [9]:
• WTLS server and root CA certificates stored in the device will be 
according to WTLS certificate defined in [9].
• Client (WTLS and application) and root CA certificates stored in 
servers will be according to X.509 as profiled in [11].
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• Client (WTLS and application) and root CA certificates which must 
be sent over the air and/or stored in WAP client devices will be 
according to X.509 as profiled in [9].
• Storage of the certificate URL in the device, rather than the full 
client certificate, is the preferred model when X.509 format certifi-
cates would otherwise be expected to be transferred over the air. 
Storage of X.509 client certificates in the device is expected to be 
the exception, unless they are provisioned on the device through a 
WIM (Wireless Identity Module) [12].
Certification path validation
A certification path is a chain of public key certificates through which a 
user can obtain the public key of another one. The primary goal of the path 
validation is to verify the binding between the client and his/her public 
key. A trust anchor is the CA verification key used by the client applica-
tion as the starting point for all certificate validation. The certification path 
length is equal to the number of certificates in the path that is the number 
of CAs in the path plus one. Since, the verifier knows and trusts the public 
key of his/her trust anchor, the trust anchor’s certificate is not included in 
the path [13].
Figure 2. WPKI architecture
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In general, the path validation process involves the following steps:
• Discovering a certification path: It is to set up a trusted path between 
the verifier’s trust anchor and the target entity based on the trust 
relationship among the entities of the PKI.
• Retrieving the certificates: It is to retrieve each certificate in the path 
from the directories where they are stored.
• Verifying the digital signatures: It is to verify the validity of the digital 
signature of each certificate in the path. It involves:
a. Decrypting the signed part of the certificate with its issuer’s 
public key.
b. Computing the hash of the certificate’s content.
c. If the result of steps a and b are the same then the signature is 
valid.
• Verifying the validity of the certificates: It is to determine if the cer-
tificates are expired or revoked. The certificates validity period is 
used to verify the expiration, while the revocation status depends 
on the revocation mechanism.
Hierarchical architecture
In a hierarchical architecture, all the users trust the same root CA (RCA), 
that is, all the users of a hierarchical PKI begin certification paths with the 
RCA public key [14]. In general, the root CA does not issue certificates to 
users but only issues certificates to subordinate CAs. Each subordinate CA 
may issue certificates to users or another level of subordinate CAs, if it is 
permitted by policies.
The certification paths are easy to build in a hierarchical PKI because the 
trust relationships are unidirectional and the longest path is equal to the 
depth of the tree plus one: a CA certificate for each subordinate CA plus 
the user’s certificate.
11Ingeniería & Desarrollo. Universidad del Norte. 27: 1-24, 2010
REducing ThE compuTaTional coST of ThE auThEnTicaTion pRocESS in SET pRoTocol
6. TRUTHC
TRUTHC [1] establishes an alternative trust relationship among the entities 
of a hierarchical PKI through two hash chains: one links the secret seeds of 
the certification authorities and the other links the certificates of each path. 
This replaces the verification operations of a path validation process by 
hash operations, which reduces the computational cost from the verifier’s 
point of view. Table 3 shows the notation used in TRUTHC.
Hash chain
A hash chain [15] is a list of values y1, y2, ..., ym linked together crypto-
graphically, where m is the length of the chain. These chains are created by 
recursively computing a hash function H over a random seed x:
y1 = H(x), y2 = H(y1), ..., ym = H(ym-1)
Table 3. Notations
Notation Meaning
KX Public key of X
KX-1 Private key of X
H(I) Hash of information I
CERTX Certificate of entity X
CntX Content of CERTX 
SigX Signature over CntX 
sRCA Random secret seed of the root CA
nX Secret seed of authority X
NX Encapsulated seed of authority X
L Certification path length.
hX Integrity check value associated with authority X
SNX Serial Number of the certificate CERTX
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A hash function H is a transformation that takes a variable-size input x 
and returns a fixed-size string, which is called the hash value. H must be a 
one-way function, that is to say:
• Given a value x, it is easy to compute H(x)
• Given a value y, it is not feasible to obtain a value x such that y = H(x)
Thus, given a value yi of the chain, it is unfeasible to compute the previous 
values. In addition, H can be collision-free, which means that it is compu-
tationally unfeasible to find any pair (x, z) such that H(x) = H(z).
Issuing certificates
TRUTHC extends the typical certificate issuing process in a hierarchical 
architecture. The chaining relation, encapsulated seed, and protocol are:
Chaining Relation
   nRCA = H(sRCA)
   nCA1 = H(nRCA,SNCA1)
   nCAi = H(nCAi-1, SNCAi), 2 ≤ i ≤ L – 1
   hCA1 = H(nRCA, CntCA1)
   hCAi = H(hCAi -1, nCAi-1, CntCAi), 2 ≤ i ≤ L – 1
   hU = H(hCAL -1, nCAL -1, CntU)
Encapsulated Seed
   NCAi = {nCAi}KCAi, 1 ≤ i ≤ L – 1
Protocol
   CAi→CAi+1: CERTRCA, CERTCAi+1, hCAi+1, NCAi+1
   CAL–1→U: CERTRCA, CERTU, hU
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It is assumed that the hash function H is collision-free. Figure 3 shows the 
chaining relation of the certificates.
Figure 3. Chaining relation
Verifying certificates
TRUTHC includes a new TTP (Trusted Third Party) to the PKI called Veri-
fication Authority (VA). VA verifies the integrity of the certificates and the 
trust relationship among the entities of a certification path.
RCA issues the certificate CERTVA, and sends to VA: the trust anchor´s cer-
tificate CERTRCA, the certificate CERTVA and the secret seed nRCA encrypted 
with the public key of VA, so that only VA can decrypt it. However, func-
tions of VA can be carried out by RCA, since this authority can compute 
the seeds of its subordinated CAs.
Encapsulated Seed
   NVA = {nRCA}KVA
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Protocol
   CA → VA: CERTRCA, CERTVA, NVA
If user V wants to verify the signature of a message sent by user U, he/she 
needs to carry out the following steps:
• User V retrieves CERTU and hU.
• User V sends VA: CERTU.
• VA retrieves the other certificates of the certification path: CERTCA1, 
CERTCA2, ..., CERTCAL-1.
• VA computes h’U by using equations of the chaining relation in 
previous subsection and the secret seed nRCA. Then, it returns h’U 
in a signed response to user V.
• User V verifies the signature of the VA response. This implies to 
verify the signature of the VA certificate with PKRCA and then the 
signature of the VA response. 
• V compares hU and h’U. If hU and h’U are the same, user V can trust 
the integrity of the certificate CERTU and that it is part of the certi-
fication path of user U.
• User V verifies the signature of the message using the public key 
of user U, KU, obtained from CERTU.
7. EXECUTION TIME OF SET PROTOCOL
In this section, the efficiency of TRUTHC is evaluated, comparing the com-
putational and communication cost of a typical PKI with the cost of a PKI 
with TRUTHC.
Scenario
A hierarchical PKI that involves the following entities is supposed (Figure 4):
• Root Certification Authority (RCA): It could be a national or interna-
tional certification authority, such as VeriSign.
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• Credit Card Certification Authority (CCCA): It could be an interna-
tional credit card company such as VISA or MasterCard. CAs issue 
certificates to PGAs.
• Payment Gateway Authority (PGA): It is the CA of some e-commerce 
application service provider. A PGA acts like mediator between the 
customer and merchant and issues certificates to users (customers 
and merchants). 
• Customer (C): Is a user that wants to obtain some object or service 
from a merchant.
• Merchant (M): Is a user that offers its products or services to the 
customers.
Figure 4. PKI structure
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Computational cost
 Numberofcryptographicoperations
Table 2 shows the number of cryptographic operations carried out during 
SET protocol, without considering the operations of the mutual-authenti-
cation process.
When customer C carries out SET protocol with the merchant M (Figure 
4), it must verify the certification path of M and PGA3 (step 4), and the 
merchant verifies the certification path of C (step 6). Thus, they carry out 
a mutual-authentication.
In a typical PKI, customer and merchant must obtain the certificates of the 
CCCA, the PGA and the user that are part of the path, and carry out three 
hash and three signature verification operations. Table 4 shows the number 
of cryptographic operations carried out by each entity during the whole 
SET protocol in a typical PKI.
Table 4. Cryptographic operations with authentication 
of SET protocol in a typical PKI
Cryptographic operation Customer Merchant RCA PGA3
Encryption 1 1 0 1
Decryption 0 1 0 2
Signature creation 1 3 0 1
Signature verification 5 5 0 2
Symmetric encryption 2 0 0 0
Symmetric decryption 0 1 0 2
Hash function 5 5 0 2
On the other hand, in a PKI with TRUTHC, it is supposed that RCA carries 
out the functions of VA. Therefore, RCA must calculate two h’U values, carry 
out hash operations and sign the messages that must be sent to customer 
and merchant with these values. Then, C and M must verify the signature 
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of the response received from RCA. The number of cryptographic opera-
tions carried out by the customer, merchant and RCA in a PKI with TRUTHC 
during the mutual-authentication process are shown in Table 5. Table 6 
shows the number of cryptographic operations carried out by each entity 
during the whole SET protocol in a PKI with TRUTHC.
Table 5. Cryptographic operations during authentication using TRUTHC
Entity OPSIG OPVER OPHASH
Customer 0 1 1
Merchant 0 1 1
RCA 2 0 10
Table 6. Cryptographic operations with authentication 
of SET protocol using TRUTHC
Cryptographic operation Customer Merchant RCA PGA3
Encryption 1 1 0 1
Decryption 0 1 0 2
Signature creation 1 3 2 1
Signature verification 3 3 0 2
Symmetric encryption 2 0 0 0
Symmetric decryption 0 1 0 2
Hash function 3 3 10 2
 EvaluationofComputationalCost
For the implementation of the cryptographic operations in each device, 
Python 2.4 with Crypto library is employed. All the entities use RSA public 
key algorithm with a key size of 1024 bits.
The following devices are considered: PDA with 200MHz ARM920T processor 
and 64MB, running Linux 2.4 operating system, laptop with 800MHZ AMD 
Turion processor and 2GB, running Linux, and PC with 3GHz Pentium IV 
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and 1 GB, running Linux. It is assumed that the customer and merchant use 
PDAs, TTPs (e.g. bank or payment gateway) use laptops, and RCA use a PC.
The execution times obtained with the PDA are: encryption/decryption 
operations performed using RSA algorithm take 0.0263s and 1.8990s, re-
spectively; a signature creation requires 1.8973s and signature verification 
requires 0.0263s; encryption/decryption operations using DES algorithm take 
0.0010s. It is used SHA-2 as hash function and its execution time is 0.0006s.
In the laptop, the execution time obtained for encryption/decryption 
operations using RSA algorithm is 0.0004s and 0.0036s, and the execution 
time of signature creation/verification operations is 0.0014s and 0.0004s, 
respectively. The encryption/decryption operations using DES algorithm 
requires 0.00001s. It is used SHA-2 as hash function and its execution time 
is 0.00001s. 
In the PC, the execution time obtained for encryption/decryption operations 
using RSA algorithm is 0.0016s and 0.000007s, and the execution time of 
signature creation/verification operations is 0.0015s and 0.0016s, respec-
tively. The encryption/decryption operations using DES algorithm requires 
0.000007s. The hash execution time using SHA-2 is 0.00001s.
Equation (1) is used to compute the computational cost (COST) of the crypto-
graphic operations carried out by the customer, merchant and trusted third 
parties in the mobile payment protocol. It is denoted the number of public 
key encryption/decryption operations with OPENC and OPDEC respectively, 
the number of signature/verification operations with OPSIG and OPVER, the 
number of symmetric key encryption/decryption operations with OPSYM 
and the number of hash operations with OPHASH. The execution time for 
each operation is defined with TX where ´X´ denotes the type of operation.
COST = (OPENC*TENC) + (OPDEC*TDEC) + (OPSIG*TSIG) + 
(OPVER*TVER) + (OPSYM*TSYM) + (OPHASH*THASH)
(1)
Table 7 shows the computational cost per entity in a typical PKI and PKI 
with TRUTHC.
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Table 7. Computational cost per entity (COST)
COST (s)
Typical PKI PKI with TRUTHC
Customer 2.0601 2.0053
Merchant 7.7527 7.6989
PGA3 0.0098 0.0098
RCA 0 0.0031
Transmission time
 Linkpacketcharacterization
A realistic characterization of the traffic is quite difficult due to the lack 
of an exact knowledge of data’s length transmitted during the protocol 
operation. For that reason, it is set the length of data transmitted among 
different entities in each step of SET protocol. 
It was decided to use DH5 link packets in the analysis. The maximum size 
of the DH5 payload is 339 bytes and each ACL link packet fits into 5 slots. 
When a link packet arrives to the Bluetooth baseband layer its payload 
consists of three parts: 1) an IP header with 20 bytes; 2) a TCP header with 
32 bytes; 3) a data with variable length. In addition, L2CAP (Logical Link 
Control and Adaptation Protocol) adds 4 bytes for channel identification 
and link packet length [6], [7]. The format of ACL link packets is shown in 
Figure 5. Therefore, the maximum length of data is 283 bytes.
It is assumed an ideal channel without link packet lost and a multi-slot 
packet transmission.
In order to initialize a new communication, the master device uses the in-
quiry procedure (Inq_p) and page scheme (Pag_s) to discover and establish 
a new communication with slave devices. The average time for the inquiry 
phase is 0.71s and 0.64s for the page phase [7].
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It is introduced some notation adopted in this paper. For the total size of 
the data is used Lp and U denotes the maximum size of data field of each 
DH5 link packet (283 bytes). In addition, NDH5 is used as the number of ACL 
link packets required to transmit the data, calculated using equation (2) :
NDH5 = Lp / U (2)
Furthermore, the total number of slots used to transmit the ACL link packets 
is indicated with ST, taking into account the empty slots. This is calculated 
using equation (3); DH5 is the number of slots required to transmit a DH5 
link packet (5 slots), that is a multi-slot packet.
ST =(NDH5 * DH5)+ NDH5 - 1 (3)
Now, the delay (D) caused by the information processing can be determined 
on: TCP layer (TCPD), IP layer (IPD), L2CAP layer (L2CAPD) and Baseband 
layer (BaseD) using equation (4). Their values are 1µs, 1µs, 1ms and 1ms, 
respectively, according to [16].
Figure 5. ACL link packet structure
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D = TCPD + IPD + L2CAPD+ BaseD (4)
The whole transmission time (TT) to transmit each message is calculated 
using equation (5), where TSLOT is the duration of each slot (625µs).
TT = (ST * TSLOT) + D (5)
Table 8 summarizes the transmission time of each message exchanged 
among the entities in SET protocol.
Table 8. Transmission time per message
Message Lp(bytes)
ACL link 
packets
NDH5
Slots
ST
TT
(s)
Whole time
(s)
1 Inq_p & Pag_s - - - 1.35
1.691
2 C to M 96 1 5 0.0051
3 M to C 11392 41 245 0.1551
4 C 500 2 11 0.0089
5 C to M 8060 29 173 0.1101
6 M 500 2 11 0.0089
7 M to PG 2524 9 53 0.0351
8 PGA3 to M 424 2 11 0.0089
9 M to C 344 2 11 0.0089
Total execution time
In this section, the total cost required by all the entities to complete SET 
protocol is calculated, from the addition of the computational cost and the 
transmission time, determined in the previous sub-sections. Thus, the to-
tal execution time required is equal to COSTT + TT. Table 9 shows the total 
execution time for each entity to carry out the SET protocol including the 
authentication process in a typical PKI and a PKI with TRUTHC.
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Table 9. Transmission time per entity
Message
Typical PKI PKI with TRUTHC
TT (s) COST (s)
Total 
execution 
time
TT (s) COST (s)
Total 
execution 
time 
C 0.1241 2.0601 2.1842 0.1241 2.0053 2.1294
M 1.5580 7.7527 9.3107 1.5580 7.6989 9.2569
PGA3 0.0089 0.0098 0.0187 0.0089 0.0098 0.0187
RCA 0 0 0 0 0.0031 0.0031
8. CONCLUSIONS
SET is a complex payment protocol that uses certificates to carry out the 
mutual authentication process between customer and merchant. This in-
creases the number of cryptographic operations that entities must carry 
out and therefore the computational cost of the protocol.
This paper presents a comparison between a typical PKI and a PKI with 
TRUTHC (Trust Relationship Using Two Hash Chains) in a mobile payment 
scenario. The computational, transmission and whole execution time of SET 
protocol is calculated. According to the obtained results, TRUTHC reduces the 
computational cost 2,66% for customer and 0,66% for merchant using RSA 
algorithm. On the other hand, the total execution time is reduced 2,51% for 
customer and 0,58% for merchant. This reduction implies a slight increase 
in the computational cost of RCA (0,0031s), but this is not a big problem, 
since RCA has more processing capacity than customer and merchant. In 
addition, if certification path length increases, the total execution time for 
costumer and merchant is the same in a PKI with TRUTHC compared with 
a typical PKI where an increase in path length implies more cryptographic 
operations for customer and merchant. The computational cost of RCA 
increases with path length but this entity carries out only hash operations 
where computational cost is low. 
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